University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law

2005

Cotton, U.S. Domestic Policy, and Trade Wars: The
Future of WTO Agriculture Negotiations
Matthew Newell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Newell, Matthew, "Cotton, U.S. Domestic Policy, and Trade Wars: The Future of WTO Agriculture Negotiations" (2005). Minnesota
Journal of International Law. 221.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/221

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.

Notes

Cotton, U.S. Domestic Policy, and Trade
Wars: The Future of WTO Agriculture
Negotiations
Matthew Newell*

INTRODUCTION
The subject of international trade in agriculture is extremely contentious. In small, undeveloped countries, agriculture represents an accessible means by which governments can
establish productive industries to raise the standard of living for
its citizens. Viewed from this perspective, one may wonder why
negotiations on the further development of an international system to promote fair trade in agricultural products would cause
thousands to protest, as was the case in Seattle, Washington in
1999.1

In the ten years since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), "liberalization" of agricultural trade has developed both positive and negative connotations. In one sense,
liberalization holds the promise of an equitable system in which
developing countries can gain access to world markets and receive a fair price for their products. 2 On the other hand, many
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2000, University
of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Thank you to my wife, Hanna Nesper Newell, for
her continuing support and encouragement, and to my editors Noriko Kurotsu and
Eliza Clark for their guidance throughout the editing process.
1. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
SEATTLE MINISTERIAL: OUTCOMES AND LESSONS LEARNED; TESTIMONY: COMMITTEE

ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE 9 (Feb. 10, 2000), at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
ns00086t.pdf [hereinafter SEATTLE MINISTERIAL].
2. See Isikeli Mataitoga, The Experience of Developing Countries in the Multilateral Trading System: An Assessment of the Seattle Ministerial and Beyond, in
ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: FINDING A NEW BALANCE 47, 49 (Kim Van der
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see the WTO as a system that exploits poor countries to the ad3
vantage of developed countries and multinational corporations.
Regardless of these opposing views, the WTO is an international
organization through which developing countries have the potential to advocate for themselves and work towards creating a
system favorable to their interests, and equitable in its administration.
This Note will analyze how recent developments in WTO
agriculture negotiations will impact future negotiations, and
subsequently, the likely success of the ongoing Doha Round.
Part I analyzes the history of international trade in agriculture
under the World Trade Organization and focuses on recent developments relating to ongoing agriculture negotiations. Part II
looks at how these recent developments affect the relative negotiating positions of major figures in the ongoing agriculture negotiations. Part III looks at the implications of a new balance in
negotiation and argues that, in light of the U.S. position with
respect to maintenance of its domestic support programs, litigation will very likely be used by developing countries to enforce
compliance with existing agreements. This Note concludes that
litigation will not ultimately achieve further liberalization of international trade in agriculture; rather, what is required is restraint on the part of developing nations and a true commitment
to liberalization of agriculture by the United States and other
developed nations.
I. AGRICULTURE AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: 1995-2004
A. THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS: ESTABLISHING A
SYSTEM OF TRADE FOR AGRICULTURE

The Marrekesh Agreement, the result of the nine-year Uruguay Round 4 of negotiations, provided for the establishment of
Borght et al. eds., 2003).
3. See id. at 48.
4. A round is a comprehensive period of negotiations with a set beginning and
end, during which a large package of concessions among members is developed and
ultimately agreed upon as a single package. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: CANCUN MINISTERIAL FAILS TO MOVE GLOBAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD: NEXT STEPS UNCERTAIN; REPORT TO CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, AND THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON WAYS

AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3 (Jan. 2004), at http://www.gao.gov/
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the WTO on January 1, 1995. 5 The Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA),6 one of several agreements annexed to the Marrekesh
Agreement, was significant because it effectively brought agricultural trade under a system of multilateral rules for the first
time, and laid a foundation for further liberalization of agricultural production and trade. 7 The long-term objective of the AoA
is "to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading
system."8 To that end, the preamble of the AoA sets out several
guiding principles. 9 Specifically, it is acknowledged that developed countries agree that their market access commitments will
take into account the agricultural needs of developing countries
in particular.10 Furthermore, commitments under the reform
program should be shared equitably among members, taking
into account a number of non-trade related concerns.1 1 Bearing
these principles in mind, the AoA outlines three "pillars": improving market access, 12 reduction of domestic support programs, 13 and a broad prohibition on maintenance of export subnew.items/d04250.pdf [hereinafter CANCUN MINISTERIAL].
5. World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 1867 TREATY SERIES: TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS REGISTERED OR FILED AND RECORDED WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 1 (1998) (1. No. 31874).
6. World Trade Organization, Agreement on Agriculture, 1867 TREATY SERIES:
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS REGISTERED OR FILED AND RECORDED
WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 410 (1998) (I. No. 31874) [hereinafter AoA].
7. Carmen G. Gonzalez, InstitutionalizingInequality: The WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433,
440 (2002); see also Hugh Corbet, Agriculture and Other Items on the World Trade
OrganizationAgenda, in AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND THE WTO: CREATING ATRADING
ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 65 (Merlinda D. Ingco ed., 2003).
8. AoA, supra note 6, at 410.

9.

Id.

10. WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 52 (Kluwer Law International 1999).
11. Id. Such concerns include food security, protecting the environment, possible negative effects on least developed countries ("LDCs") and net food-importing
countries, and the integral principles of special and differential treatment. Id.
12. The market access commitments of the AoA deal broadly with tariffs, requiring members to establish tariff-only regimes (known as "tariffication") whereby
non-tariff import restrictions are converted into tariff barriers that provide an
equivalent level of protection. These levels must then be reduced over the implementation period. Id.
13. With respect to domestic support, the concept underlying the AoA is that
there are generally two types of support: "Green Box" measures, which have little or
no trade-distorting effect, and "Amber Box" measures, which have trade-trade distorting effects. Id. at 56. To be regarded as Green Box, support measures must
meet the criteria in Annex 2 to the AoA. Id. at 57. Green Box measures are essentially those which are part of a publicly-funded government program, not involving
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sidy programs. 14 In order to accomplish the aims of further liberalizing trade, the Marrakesh Agreement calls for Ministerial
Conferences to be held every two years, 15 and the AoA itself
called for agricultural negotiations to resume through Commit-

tee on Agriculture (CoA) meetings by early 2000 in order to
16
agree on further liberalization measures.

B. THE EXPERIENCE OF IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT ON
AGRICULTURE
1. Implementation and Developed Countries
It became clear during the implementation period that the
AoA was a good foundation for further liberalization of agricultural trade, but that considerable progress was still necessary.17
With respect to export subsidies, while the AoA instituted a
rigid program of reducing the use of export subsidies, the European Union (EU) continued to rely heavily on such measures
through the maintenance of its Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP).18 Because the EU accounts for more than ninety percent
of global export subsidy expenditures, continuing negotiations
since the AoA have largely focused on reducing EU domestic retransfers from consumers, and which do not provide price support to producers. Id.
Measures that qualify as Green Box are exempt from reduction requirements. Id.
Trade distorting (Amber Box) practices are measured according to the Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). Id. at 58. Base Total AMS for each member is a
quantification of all domestic agricultural subsidies during the 1986-88 base period.
Id. Three types of Amber Box support are exempt from reduction requirements: 1)
de-minimus support; 2) certain measures to encourage rural and agricultural development in developing countries, and 3) certain direct payments under productionlimiting programs (known as "Blue Box"). Id.
14. Export subsidies are banned under the AoA unless they qualify under one
of four limited exceptions. Id. at 59.
15. ASIF H. QURESHI, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE NORMS 6 (Manchester University Press 1996).
16. Id. at 40.
17. See generally Mary E. Burfisher, Options for Agricultural Policy Reform in
the World Trade OrganizationNegotiations, in AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND THE WTO:
CREATING A TRADING ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 135 (Merlinda D. Ingco ed.,

2003).
18. See id. at 143. During the implementation period, the Common Agricultural Policy was the single largest expenditure in the EU budget (42% of total). Because European farmers had come to rely on its generous subsidies, reform was an
extremely controversial domestic policy matter. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: EARLY DECISIONS ARE VITAL TO PROGRESS IN
ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS; REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 13 (Sept. 2000),

at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02879.pdf [hereinafter EARLY DECISIONS].
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liance export subsidies.1 9
Of the three pillars, domestic support was the least effective
aspect of the AoA in terms of achieving the stated objective of
creating a fair and market-oriented agriculture trading system. 20 In this respect, the AoA left in place "an uneven playing
21
field of domestic support across countries and commodities."
Countries with high support levels in the base period have high
ceilings that allow continued high support, while countries with
no support are constrained in their ability to introduce new domestic support measures. 22 The United States typifies the continued high support levels of developed countries. As of 1998,
the United States had met only 44.7 percent of its ceiling. 23 In
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) 24 as a whole, almost sixty percent of domestic agricultural support is excluded from reduction commitments. 25 In
fact, during this period, reduction of Total Current AMS was accompanied by an increase in exempt support, particularly Green
Box support. 26 The United States, EU, and Japan recorded the
largest increases in Green Box support.27 The increase in the
United States can be attributed to the shift towards decoupled
payments under the 1996 FAIR Act, 28 which are exempt Green

19. Burfisher, supra note 17, at 143.
20. Tim Josling, Domestic Farm Policies and the WTO Negotiations on Domestic Support, prepared for INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: AGRICULTURAL POLICY
REFORM AND THE WTO: WHERE ARE WE HEADING? 4 (Capri, Italy, June 23-26,

2003), at http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/invited%20papers/osling.pdf.
21. Burfisher, supra note 17, at 139.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 141.
24. The OECD is a group of thirty industrialized countries which share "a
commitment to democratic government and the market economy." OECD, About
OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_201185_1_1_11_1 ,00.html
(last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
25. Dimitris Diakosavvas, The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in
Practice: How Open are OECD Markets?, in AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND THE WTO:
CREATING A TRADING ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 21, 43 (Merlinda D. Ingco

ed., 2003).
26. Id.
27. Id. Examples of Green Box support include direct support to farmers that
is decoupled from production, payments for relief from natural disasters, and domestic food aid, among many other categories. AoA, supranote 6, at 425-29 (Annex 2).
28. David Orden, U.S. AgriculturalPolicy: The 2002 Farm Bill and WTO Doha
Round Proposal, WTO NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGES IN NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
AND TRADE POLICIES: CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 33 (International

Food Policy Research Institute Feb. 2003), at http://www.ifpri.org/divs/tmd/dp
papers/tmdpl09.pdf. For an explanation of decoupled support programs, see supra
note 27 and infra note 124.
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Box support under the AoA.29

2. Implementation and Developing Countries
During and after the implementation period, it became apparent to developing nations that the "gospel of trade liberalization," as embodied in the AoA, was largely illusory. 30 This perception can be understood in light of the fact that agricultural
trade became a negotiating priority during the Uruguay Round
because of vigorous competition between the United States and
the EU to expand their shares of international agricultural
markets. 3 1 As a result, though the text of the AoA was drafted
in light of a commitment to reducing trade distorting practices
with the special needs of developing countries in mind, the
agreement largely reflects the needs and priorities of developed
gains
countries at the time.32 As such, many of the economic
33
promised to developing countries did not materialize.
C. THE DOHAROUND
1. Launching a New Round
The 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar succeeded
in finalizing a declaration,3 4 known as the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA).35 The DDA calls for a new negotiating Round,
29.

See John Baffes, Cotton: Market Setting, Trade Policies, and Issues, Re-

search Working Paper 3218, DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS GROUP, THE WORLD BANK 19

In
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.ccawaibl.com/uploads/worldbankcotton.pdf.
fact, the United States largely relies on domestic support programs, as it has generally low tariffs and few export subsidy programs. Orden, supra note 28.
30. See generally Mataitoga, supra note 2, at 47-63.
31. Gonzalez, supra note 7, at 449-50.
32. Id. Through the use of domestic support and export subsidies under the
CAP, the EU had changed from a net food importer to a net food exporter. Id. at
450. Thus, as the EU was rapidly gaining market share and dumping excess production on world markets, the United States, facing budgetary pressure to reduce
agricultural subsidies and hoping to benefit domestic producers by curbing EU use
of export subsidies, made agriculture reform a priority of the Uruguay Round. Id.
33. Mataitoga, supra note 2, at 49; see supra notes 17-29 and accompanying
text.
34. The previous Ministerial Conference, held in 1999 in Seattle, WA, failed to
launch a new round amidst significant world protest. See SEATTLE MINISTERIAL,
supra note 1, at 3. The failure was largely due to insufficient preparation and an
ineffective negotiating structure which excluded a number of developing nations
from meaningful participation in negotiations. Id. at 2.
35. World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration,
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scheduled to last three years, and to be completed by January 1,
2005.36 The DDA is a "single undertaking," which means that
agreements on different topics must be accepted together as one
package.37 As was the case during the implementation period,
agriculture continued to be one of the most contentious areas of
negotiation, and thus, a cornerstone of the DDA.38 The provisions of the DDA dealing with agriculture mandate further progress, calling for negotiations aimed at accomplishing "reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export
subsidies" for farm products and "substantial reductions in
trade-distorting domestic" support schemes, but "without prejudging the outcome" of these talks, and taking into account the
need for special and differential treatment for under-developed
39
countries.
While the Doha Ministerial was declared a success, 40 the
DDA itself largely symbolizes only an agreement for further negotiations, with few substantive commitments. 41 With respect
to the provisions on agriculture, the DDA constitutes a good basis for future negotiations because it broadly covers all possible
forms of protection, from tariffs to subsidies of all kinds. 42 The
progress made in launching a new round is widely attributed to
the leadership of the United States, whose flexibility and stated
commitment to accomplishing liberalization through WTO negotiations were crucial in obtaining agricultural concessions from
the EU. 43 These concessions, in turn, allowed the two parties to

41 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter
DDA].
36. Raj Bhala, Challenges of Poverty and Islam Facing American Trade Law,
17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 471, 472 (2003). The end-date of the Doha Round
has since been postponed indefinitely. See infra note 95.
37. See DDA, supra note 35, 47.
38. See Melaku Geboye Desta, Agriculture and the Doha Development
Agenda: Any Hopes for Improvement?, in ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:
FINDING A NEW BALANCE 149 (Kim Van der Borght et al. eds., 2003) (stating that
agriculture, as it had been during the Uruguay Round, was the "deal-maker" at the
Doha conference); see also EARLY DECISIONS, supranote 18, at 12-13.
39. DDA, supra note 35, 13.
40. See Press Release, WTO, Ministerial Conference Ends with Agreement on
New Programme (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres0l_e/
pr255_-e.htm.
41. Bhala, supra note 36, at 476.
42. Patrick A. Messerlin, Agriculture in the Doha Agenda, prepared for WORLD
BANK ROUNDTABLE ON POLICY RESEARCH IN PREPARATION FOR THE 5TH WTO
MINISTERIAL 1 (Aug. 2002), at http://www.econ.worldbank.org/files/25198wps3009.pdf.
43. EARLY DECISIONS, supra note 18, at 28.
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work together to forge a consensus among other WTO members,44 many of whom are developing countries with diverse in45
terests.
After the conclusion of the Ministerial Conference in Doha,
the difficult task still lay ahead: 46 the DDA called for agriculture
modalities to be established by March 31, 2003. 47 Modalities

were a crucial next step in the negotiating process because they
set out a framework for the continuation of negotiations by "giving members a broad outline of goals and targets for the further
liberalization of agriculture trade and the time lines for achieving them."48 The modalities were to be used by member coun-

tries in the preparation of their country-specific reduction commitment offers which, under the Doha timetable, were due at
the fifth Ministerial Conference held in Cancun, Mexico in Sep49
tember, 2003.

2. Problems in Furtheringthe Round
a. Failure to Reach the March 31, 2003 Agriculture Modalities
Deadline
Ongoing agricultural negotiations hit a potentially fatal
stumbling block when negotiators failed to reach the March 31,
2003 modalities deadline.5 0 The negotiations had covered a
broad range of agricultural liberalization issues, and little progress was made because countries had become deeply entrenched in their positions and unwilling to make concessions. 5 1
Specifically, sharp differences over issues such as the formula
for cutting tariffs, types of subsidies disciplined, and the extent
to which developing countries should be granted favorable terms
resulted in the failure to reach an agreement. 52 Despite the im44. Id. at 7.
45. See id. at 18-19.
46. See id. at 12.
47. DDA, supra note 35, 14.
48. Daniel Pruzin & Joe Kirwin, Trade Diplomats Downplay Impact of Missed
Deadline in WTO Farm Talks, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 587, 587 (Apr. 3, 2003).
49. Id.
50. See Agriculture Modalities: Deadline Missed, Eyes Now on Cancun, 7
BRIDGES-WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST (Apr. 2, 2003), at http://www.ictsd.org/
weekly/03-04-02/storyl.htm [hereinafter Agriculture Modalities].
51. See id.
52. Daniel Pruzin, Trade Officials End WTO Meeting on Doha with Few Signs
of Progress, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 629, 629 (Apr. 10, 2003).
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portance of establishing a draft text on modalities, 53 member
countries and WTO officials downplayed the failure and remained optimistic that a modalities draft could be worked out
before Cancun. 54 Domestic policy issues of the EU and United
States, which are discussed below, played a significant part in

this failure.55
The United States was widely criticized for enactment of its
2002 Farm Bill, 56 which was seen by many WTO member countries as a retreat from existing agricultural liberalization com-

mitments.5 7 This legislation was of particular concern to the international community because 1) it was argued that the Farm
Bill would cause the United States to exceed its Uruguay Round
limit on domestic support subsidies,5 8 and 2) given that WTO
members were then in the process of negotiating further reductions in farm subsidies and liberalization of agricultural trade,
it was seen to seriously undermine the negotiations. 59 These
claims were particularly important, as the United States is recognized as a key leader in agricultural negotiations. 60 In the
face of severe criticism, the United States defended the Bill by
arguing that under AoA commitments, it is allowed to provide
$19.1 billion a year in trade-distorting domestic support, and
that domestic support provided by the 2002 Farm Bill will not
61
result in that limit being exceeded.

53. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
54. See Press Release, WTO, Farm Talks Miss Deadline; but 'Work Must Go
On', Says Supachai, (Mar. 31, 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/news/new-e/
pres03_-e/pr336_3.htm.
55. See CANCUN MINISTERIAL, supranote 4, at 10.
56. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C. § 7901 et. seq.
(West Supp. 2004) [hereinafter 2002 Farm Bill]. The Bill boosted government support for certain crops and dairy products by approximately $6.4 billion annually over

six years. Gary G. Yerkey, Zoellick Calls EU Charges of Protectionism 'Sanctimonious,' Defends Farm Bill Subsidies, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 915, 915 (May 23,
2002). The 2002 Farm Bill does not impose new market access restrictions nor does
it increase agricultural export subsidies; it addresses only domestic agricultural
support. Fact Sheet, United States Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, USTR Describes Farm
Bill in Context of Other WTO Members' Support Limits, at http://japan.usembassy.
gov/e/p/tp-20030911b3.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).

57.

Daniel Pruzin, Farm Bill Will Not Impact Doha Round AgricultureNegotia-

tions, Allgeier Claims, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1292, 1293 (July 25, 2002).

58.

Derrick Cain et al., Senate Passes Farm Bill After House Vote; Supporters

Defend Against Foreign Criticism, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 830, 830 (May 9,
2002).
59. Pruzin, supra note 57, at 1293.
60. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; ORDEN, supra note 28, at 33.

61.

Gary G. Yerkey, New Farm Bill Will Not Cause U.S. to Violate its Commit-

ments in WTO, U.S. Official Says, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 953, 954 (May 30,
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Despite widespread criticism of the 2002 Farm Bill, fault for
the failure to reach agreement on the modalities text is commonly attributed to the European Commission (EC). 62 As a result of an internal EU mid-term review of the CAP in June of
2003, the EC was unable to demonstrate flexibility with respect
to the phasing out of export subsidies. 63 The EU's inflexibility
was extremely problematic because the elimination of export
subsidies continued to be a main focus of negotiations. 64 Thus
because the EU, in addition to a number of other developed
countries, was unable to demonstrate flexibility in the negotiation process as a result of domestic political forces, negotiators
65
were unable to reach agreement.
b. Collapse of the 2003 Cancun Ministerial
The 2003 Cancun Ministerial, like the Seattle Ministerial in
1999, failed in achieving an agreement.6 6 The objective of the
Cancun Ministerial was to assess the progress of current negotiations, and provide political impetus and a framework for further progress with the round.6 7 The Ministerial meeting had
begun cautiously, as little progress had been made in negotiations during the year prior to the conference, largely due to concern over the CAP.68 While the Ministerial failed for a number
of reasons, agricultural negotiations remained a cornerstone of
the overall negotiations, and failed to make significant pro2002); cf. supra text accompanying note 23 (noting that the United States had met
only 44.7% of its ceiling on permitted domestic support under the AoA).
62. Id. The European Commission negotiates trade agreements on behalf of
the European Union member countries. Id.
63. See AgricultureModalities, supra note 50.
64. See Burfisher, supra note 17, at 143.
65. See AgricultureModalities, supra note 50.
66. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON
TRADE MISSION TO THE WTO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN CANCUN, WMCP: 108-9, at 1

(Comm. Print Sept. 2003) [hereinafter TRADE MISSION], availableat http://frwebgate
.access. gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 108_ways.andmeanscommitteeprints
&docid=f:91324.pdf.
67. STAFF OF HOUSE OF COMMONS INT'L DEV. COMM.,
TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO: LEARNING THE LESSONS OF CANCUN TO REVIVE A

GENUINE DEVELOPMENT ROUND, HC 92-1, at 6 (First Report 2003-04) [hereinafter
LESSONS OF CANCUN], available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cmint
dev/92/92.pdf.
68. CANCUN MINISTERIAL, supra note 4, at 7. After considerable internal debate, the EU agreed to CAP reform, including introduction of decoupled support programs. Id. Even after the reform was announced, WTO members were still unsure
whether the stated reforms would result in a significantly ambitious negotiating
proposal. Id.
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gress. 69 Three issues were of particular significance: 1) the inability of the EU, Japan, and Korea to negotiate ambitious liberalization in agricultural trade, 70 2) the newly-created G20
group of developing countries' opposition to proposed plans on
the ground that they were not drastic enough in liberalizing agricultural trade, 7 1 and 3) the insistence of four African countries
that support and subsidies on cotton be eliminated immedi72
ately.
The Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, 73 proposed by
four West and Central African countries, brought the issue of
domestic support of cotton to the forefront of overall WTO negotiations.7 4 The Initiative stated that LDC-countries have made
strenuous efforts to comply with all WTO agriculture liberalization objectives, and despite becoming among the most efficient
producers of cotton, all resulting economic benefits are nullified
75
It
by the domestic support programs of developed countries.
singled out the United States, EU, and China as the largest
subsidizers of cotton, 76 and claimed that their domestic support
programs were significantly driving down world prices.7 7 Con69. LESSONS OF CANCUN, supra note 67, at 6.
70. See supratext accompanying note 65.
71. CANCUN MINISTERIAL, supra note 4, at 14-15.
The Cairns GroupArgentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa,
Thailand, and Uruguay-is a group of net-agriculture exporting countries that has
often sided with the United States on an ambitious liberalization agenda. Id. at 11.
The emergence of the G20-a group fluctuating in number, more diverse than the
Cairns Group, but with significant overlap in membership-was important because
it pushed for even more drastic liberalization proposals, openly criticized proposals
by a number of developed countries, and was in turn criticized by developed countries for its aggressive negotiating tactics. Id. at 14-15.
72. Id. at 15. These countries were Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.
LESSONS OF CANCUN, supra note 67, at 20.
73. Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad & Mali, Poverty Reduction:
Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, TN/AG/GEN/4 (May 16, 2003) [hereinafter
Sectoral Initiative], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/genhome.asp? language=l&_=l. The document WT/MIN(03)/W/2 (Aug. 15, 2003) is the actual document presented at the Cancun Ministerial.
74. INT'L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., AGRICULTURE
NEGOTIATIONS AT THE WTO, Q. INTELLIGENCE REP. No. 10, at 8 (Mar. 2004), at
http://www.ictsd.orglissarea/atsd/products/docs/AgricultureNegotiations lo.pdf.
75. Sectoral Initiative, supra note 73, 1 T 1, 3.
76. Id.
16 (stating that combined support given by these three countries was
estimated at US$6 billion in 2001-02 and concluding that the WTO objectives of
phasing out production and export subsidies have not been achieved in the case of
cotton).
77. Id.
21, 23 (stating that "[i]t has been established that there is a link between large-scale subsidies and the collapse in global cotton prices over the past
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sequently, the countries demanded that cotton support programs be immediately eliminated, and farmers in developing
countries compensated for losses suffered during the phasing78
out of such programs.
The absoluteness and immediacy of this proposal underscores the significance of the cotton issue: cotton is the single
most important textile fiber in the world, and accounts for thirty
to forty percent of export earnings, and in the four African countries who tabled the proposal, between five to ten percent of
gross domestic product (GDP).79 The international market has
been subject to considerable market intervention in the United
States and EU, two of the largest and most inefficient producers
of cotton.8 0 This movement was, therefore, a specific demonstration of developing countries' general frustration over the refusal
of the United States and EU to make significant cuts to their
harmful domestic support programs. 8 ' Despite support from a
number of countries, the United States refused to specifically
address immediate elimination of cotton support programs during the Ministerial and afterwards.8 2 Rather, the United States
tabled a proposal which focused on the elimination of tariffs on
textiles and garments and restructuring aid for African cotton
industries; the U.S. proposal and the compromise proposal of
Director-General Supachai were not well received by the African
8 3
countries.
c. Effective Participation is a Resource-Intensive Endeavor
A contributing factor to ongoing difficulties in the negotiating process has been ineffective participation on the part of developing countries. Maintaining a constant presence in the
daily operations of the WTO-small-scale meetings, informal re-

decade," and citing in support the fact that during the period 1999/2000-2001/02,
while production increased by 14 percent, export earnings fell by 31 percent).
78. Id.
26, 35-39.
79. SECTORAL INITIATIVE, supra note 73, 9;see also BAFFES, supra note 29, at
V.

80. See BAFFES, supra note 29, at v-vi. The U.S. cotton sector is expected to
receive approximately $4 billion in support through 2008, which means U.S. producers will receive close to twice the world market price for their cotton. Id. at 13; see
also Dennis T. Avery, Should U.S. Try to Derail WTO Decision on Cotton Subsidies?,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 21, 2004, at 7A.
81. See generally BAFFES, supranote 29.
82. See Daniel Pruzin, EU to Reaffirm Initiative to Address African Demands
on Cotton Subsidies, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 271, 271 (Feb. 12, 2004).
83. Id.
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lationship-building, etc.-in Geneva requires extensive financial, intellectual, and personnel resources.8 4 Many developing
countries do not, however, have the requisite resources at their
disposal to ensure an effective presence in routine, but important, processes in Geneva.8 5 To address this problem, the WTO
has a program to provide assistance, which enables developing
nations to better participate in day-to-day processes at the
WTO.8 6 Unfortunately, this fund has not proven effective in
overcoming the fundamental problems developing countries experience in maintaining a presence like that of major countries
such as the United States, and significant disparities continue
87
to exist.
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE
DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATION
1. Expirationof the "PeaceClause"
The "Peace Clause" of AoA Article 13 was an important factor in agricultural trade negotiations from 1995 through 2003.
Under the terms of the Peace Clause, most WTO dispute settlement challenges against a country's agriculture programs were
precluded so long as subsidies conformed to liberalization commitments under the AoA.88 Thus, while the United States and
EU were required to reduce existing domestic subsidies and
banned from enacting new export subsidies under the AoA, they
were allowed to maintain annual government support at a combined level of US $150 billion annually, without the possibility
89
of legal challenge from other countries.
This protection ended on January 1, 2004, when the Peace
Clause expired. 90 As a result, the full substantive and legal apparatus of the WTO is, for the first time, available to member
countries for challenging EU and U.S. agricultural subsidies. 9 1

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Bhala, supra note 36, at 488-89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Richard H. Steinberg & Timothy E. Josling, When the Peace Ends: The

Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to the WTO Legal Challenge, 6 J.
INTL ECON. L. 369, 369 (2003).
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 370.
Id.
Id.
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In light of the increasing frustration of developing countries
over the lack of progress in agriculture liberalization negotiations, many commentators have forecast that developing countries will turn to WTO litigation to achieve their aims. 92 The
case brought by Brazil against the U.S. cotton subsidies is seen
93
as possibly the first case in a new type of "trade war."
2. Agreement on the DDA MandatedFramework for Agriculture
Modalities
By July of 2004, the WTO had come to an almost complete
standstill as a result of the divide created in the wake of the
failed Cancun Ministerial. 94 The WTO had imposed upon itself
the end of July 2004 as a deadline for drafting an agriculture
framework. 95 It was widely feared that failure to meet the deadline would do irreparable harm to the Doha Round and the WTO
96
itself.
Despite last minute doubts as to whether a framework
would be agreed upon, an "historic" twelve-hour negotiating session on July 31 resulted in a broad policy framework. 97 The
framework was hailed by many officials as a "milestone" that
cleared the way for framework negotiations in other areas,
thereby re-energizing the stalled DDA negotiations. 98
The
United States continued to act as a leader in the process, demonstrating and stressing the need for flexibility and submitting

92. See Michael D. Goldhaber & Matt Fleischer-Black, Trade Wars, THE
AMERICAN LAWYER, Mar. 2004, at 14; Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, THE ECONOMIST,
April 30, 2004, availableat http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?
story~jd=2626900.
93. Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, supra note 92; see discussion infra Parts I.D.3,
II-III.
94. See, e.g., Ashfak Bokhari, Major Bid to Salvage Doha Talks, DAWN, July 19,
2004, at http://www.dawn.com/2004/07/19/ebr8.htm.
95. Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., WTO: July Framework Agreed
at Eleventh Hour, 8 BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DfGEST, Aug. 3, 2004, at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-08-03/storyl.htm [hereinafter Eleventh Hour]. While
the original March 31, 2003 deadline was for establishing a modalities text, given
the substantial difficulty of arriving at any kind of agreement, the self-imposed July
deadline aimed only at establishing a more general framework. See id.
96. Bimal Ghosh, Trade Jitters, THE WALL STREET J. EUR., July 29, 2004, at
A7.
97. Gary G. Yerkey, Farm Deal Clears Way for Broader Pact Setting Framework for Future WTO Talks, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1304, 1304 (Aug. 5, 2004);
see also Christopher S. Rugaber, WTO FrameworkMakes 'Historic'Changes to Farm
Trade Talks, Johnson Says, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1340, 1341 (Aug. 12, 2004).
98. Yerkey, supranote 97, at 1304.
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draft proposals to move negotiations forward. 99

The "July Package" 100 essentially narrows the parameters
for future negotiations on trade in agriculture, industrial goods,
services, and other areas. 101 While the framework is itself an
extremely significant accomplishment, there is still much work
ahead because modalities of substance remain to be negotiated.10 2 As with the DDA generally, the provisions which deal
with the three agriculture "pillars" are central to the July Pack3
age.10
The final text of the July Package reflects the fact that the
EU had by this time agreed to eliminate its use of export subsidies.1 04 Thus, with respect to export subsidies, the agreement
uses strong language which aims at the elimination of export
subsidies by a certain, but currently undetermined date.1 05 The
market access provisions, while not eliminating use of tariffs,
call for relatively straightforward reductions through use of a tobe-determined formula, by which tariffs will be grouped into
tiers and reduced in varying degrees.1 0 6
Unlike the other two "pillars," which represent an agreement to work towards further reductions, the market access
provisions are a combination of reductions and redefinitions,
which have a much more uncertain result. Members agreed to
reduce overall trade distorting support by twenty percent. 07
99. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Ag Chair Sees Market Access Progress, 21 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1092, 1094 (July 1, 2004) (discussing United States's draft proposal); see
also Rossella Brevetti, Supachai Stresses U.S. Leadership in WTO; Says U.S. Elections Will Not Impede Progress, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 385, 385 (Mar. 4, 2004)
(statement of Supachai) ('The reality is this: when the U.S. leads, the system can
move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts.")
100. The July Package is the name by which the WTO refers to the July 31
framework. General Council, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August
2004, Annex A, WTfLI579, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda_e/
draft text gcdg_31july04_e.htm [hereinafter July Package].
101. Rugaber, supra note 97, at 1340.
102. Eleventh Hour, supra note 95. The end-date of January 1, 2005 was postponed indefinitely in recognition of the significant work ahead. Id.
103. See July Package, supra note 100, Annex A (provisions on agriculture constitute approximately half of the framework).
104. See Daniel Pruzin, Agriculture Official Says EU Ready to Move on Subsidy
Demands, Subject to Conditions, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 722, 722 (Apr. 29,
2004); see also CANCUN MINISTERIAL, supranote 4, at 7; cf. supra notes 18-19.
105. July Package, supra note 100, Annex A, 17.
106. Id.
27-28.
107. Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., The Main Featuresof the Agriculture Modalities Framework,8 BRIDGES MONTHLY REV. 3, 3 (July-Aug. 2004), at
http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/ BRIDGES8-7.pdf [hereinafter Main Features].
Under the July Package, trade distorting support compromises final bound total
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However, after the focus of negotiations shifted away from export subsidies, the United States insisted upon redefinition of
108
the Blue Box to accommodate U.S. counter-cyclical payments.
Despite proposals of developing countries since Cancun, which
have called for elimination of the Blue Box, and intense lastminute negotiations on the topic, U.S. demands were included in
the framework, essentially creating a new category of exempt
support.10 9 The impact of this Blue Box redefinition is unclear,
as the domestic support provisions may limit this new flexibility
by requiring further negotiation of "additional criteria" to ensure that Blue Box Payments "are less distorting than AMS
measures," take into account other WTO rights and obligations,
and "will not have the perverse effect of undoing ongoing reforms."'110 In addition to the redefined Blue Box, the impact of
the July Package on domestic support programs is unclear due
to the inclusion of language calling for review and clarification
of the Green Box, "with a view to ensuring that Green Box
measures have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects
or effects on production.""'
Continuing calls for action by the authors of the Sectoral
Initiative in Favour of Cotton led to a partial resolution of the
matter through last-minute negotiations and subsequent inclusion of provisions in the July Package. 112 The framework incorporated a separate provision which states that the cotton issue
will be dealt with "ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically"
within the WTO agriculture talks." 3 To ensure such treatment
of the matter, the July Package calls for creation of a subcommittee and states that the CoA must ensure "appropriate prioriAMS, permitted de minimus levels, and permitted Blue Box levels. Id. In addition
to this general reduction, Amber Box support will eventually be cut and de minimus
support reduced. Id.
108. Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, Delays Occur in New WTO Framework
Text; Ag Chair Warns Draft is Substantially Revised, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1266, 1266-67 (July 29, 2004). Counter-cyclical payments are an income safety net,
where payments are based on historical production and are not tied to current production (and thus "decoupled"). Econ. Research Serv./U.S. Dep't of Agric., Countercyclical payments, at http://www.ers.usda.gov/features/farmbill/analysis/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2004). Under this program (new under 2002 Farm Bill), counter-cyclical
payments are available whenever the effective market price is less than the target
price (established by a 2002-03 base price). Id.
109. Main Features,supra note 107, at 3.
110. July Package, supra note 100, Annex A, 14.
111. Id.
16.
112. Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., African Nations Resolve Cotton Dispute, 21 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1306, 1306 (Aug 5, 2004).
113. July Package, supra note 100, Annex A, 4.
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tization of the cotton issue independently from other sectoral
initiatives."'11 4 Hence, while the African countries acceded to
U.S. pleas that the cotton issue be treated within larger agriculture negotiations rather than as a stand-alone issue, the agree11 5
ment is nonetheless an important step in the right direction.
3. Brazil v. United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton
Some see Brazil's complaint against U.S. cotton subsidies as
the first battle in a new era of "trade wars."1 1 6 Accordingly, the
September 8, 2004 publication of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) panel ruling in Brazil v. United States-Subsidies
on Upland Cottonl 17 was a highly significant event. The panel
had been asked to determine whether various U.S. domestic
support measures were inconsistent with obligations under provisions of the AoA, GATT 1994, and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. 118 The panel agreed with
Brazil's principal claim, holding that the amount of subsidies
provided to cotton producers in the years 1999 through 2002
caused "serious prejudice" to Brazilian producers by encouraging U.S. production and driving down world prices. 119 The
United States had asserted that the support practices were
shielded by the Peace Clause,1 20 but the panel found that the
121
subsidies were over 1992 limits, and therefore actionable.
In reaching these conclusions, the panel made two significant findings. First, the court found that U.S. Export Credit
Guarantee Programs and a category of Step 2 marketing payments offered to exporters were illegal export subsidies under
114. Id.
115. See Yerkey, supra note 112, at 1306.
116. See Goldhaber & Fleischer-Black, supra note 92, at 14-15.
117. Report of the Panel, WTO, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/R at 1-2 (Sept. 8,2004), at http://www.wto.org. The panel was formed on
March 18, 2003, pursuant to the request of Brazil. Id. at 1.
118. THE WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 10, at 1-2. GATT 1994 is the basic set
of trade rules, largely taken over from GATT 1947 (the predecessor of the WTO),
that in conjunction with Annex IA agreements (including AoA) now represent goodsrelated obligations of WTO members. Id. The SCM Agreement aims at balancing
concerns that government subsidies should not put other countries' industries at a
disadvantage, and outlines a system of dealing with claims of unfair use of subsidies. Id. at 90-91. Subsidies are classified as exempt (Green Box), actionable (Amber Box), or prohibited. Id. at 91-92.
119. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Backs Brazil in Complaint Against U.S. Over
Cotton Subsidies, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 716, 716 (Apr. 29, 2004).
120. Since the matter was filed in 2003, the peace clause had not yet expired.
121. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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the SCM Agreement.122 As such, they must be "withdrawn
without delay."123 Second, the court found that certain Producer
Flexibility Contracts (PFC) and Direct Payments (DP) paid out
under the 1996 Farm Act were prohibited Amber Box subsidies,
124
rather than Green Box as the United States had contended.
Thus, concluding that the Peace Clause protected none of these
items, the panel found that a direct causal link existed between
these price-contingent (not decoupled) payments and significant
price suppression of cotton on the world market. 125 Accordingly,
the United States will be required to remove the adverse effects
126
causing the serious prejudice.
Upon announcement of the decision, the United States
made several emphatic assertions. First, it notified the DSB of
127
its decision to appeal adverse aspects of the panel report.
Furthermore, it reiterated its position that there will be no immediate changes to domestic cotton programs until the appeal
has been heard. 128 Finally, in light of the significant debate and
international interest in the outcome of the dispute, the United
States has confirmed its dedication to achieving change through
continued negotiations, rather than litigation. 29
II. CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF POWER: DEVELOPING
122. Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Unraveling the Details and
Potential Impacts of the Final Cotton Report, 8 BRIDGES MONTHLY REV. 12, 12 (Sept.
2004), at http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES8-8.pdf [hereinafter Unraveling the Details]. Export Credits are programs that offer loan guarantees to foreign
buyers in countries where credit markets are not fully developed.
CANCUN
MINISTERIAL, supra note 4, at 13 n.16. Step-2 market payments are made to eligible
cotton exporters and domestic end users of cotton who purchase U.S. cotton when
domestic U.S. prices exceed prices in northern Europe by a certain level. BAFFES,
supra note 29, at 13.
123. Id.
124.
Unraveling the Details, supra note 122, at 12. They were not Green Box
because under the AoA, such payments must be "decoupled," that is, not linked directly to growing (or abstaining from growing) a specific type of crop. Instead, these
programs were held to be directly linked because they require farmers not to grow
fruit or nuts. Id.

125. Id.
126. John Baffes, Trade Note, Brazil vs. US: Cotton Subsidies and Implications
for Development, The World Bank Group 4 (July 12, 2004), at http://www.worldbank
.org.
127. WTO News, WTO, US Appeals Panel Report on Cotton, (Oct. 18, 2004), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news-e.htm [hereinafter US Appeals Report].
128.
Unravelingthe Details, supra note 122, at 12.
129. Gary G. Yerkey, Rosella Brevetti, & Derek Cain, U.S. Plans to Appeal WTO
Cotton Ruling Citing 'Serious Concerns' with Decision, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
718, 718-19 (Apr. 29, 2004).
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COUNTRIES VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES
The period from July 2003 to September 2004 saw the rise
of cotton as a singularly important topic in overall agriculture
negotiations. 130 The development of cotton as a topic of negotiation, distinct from broader discussions on the three pillars and
related issues, provides the opportunity to analyze the important issues underlying agricultural negotiations generally, and
to do so free from the analytical complexities that arise due the
large number of issues simultaneously negotiated as part of the
Doha Round. 131 Furthermore, such an analysis is extremely
important because the cotton issue will play a significant role in
ongoing negotiations, and will therefore affect the likelihood of
reaching a successful conclusion to the current Doha Round.
Recent events relating to cotton will have direct consequences on the balance of power in future agriculture negotiations, particularly with respect to two major blocs/countries.
First, developing nations have recently made significant gains
in negotiating power, resulting in the potential for a more balanced outcome to the current Round. Second, while the U.S.
leadership has been instrumental in making progress in agriculture negotiations thus far, 13 2 recent developments have highlighted the fact that long-term U.S. domestic policy is inconsistent with the aims of the AoA. This makes it highly unlikely
that the United States will be able to assume its customary and
necessary leadership role in continuing agriculture negotiations.
Consequently, the relative changes in power between these two
major negotiating forces, in addition to larger cotton-related issues, will play a significant role in determining the outcome of
the current Round.
A. RELATIVE GAINS IN THE NEGOTIATING POWER OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
1. Brazil vs. United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton:
Creating Significant Precedent
The ruling against U.S. cotton subsidies is extremely important to developing nations in two significant respects. First, the
130. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
131. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing July Package
provision making cotton subsidies a separate negotiation topic).
132. See Brevetti, supra note 99, at 385.
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decision, from an international organization with widely accepted legitimacy,133 held that U.S. domestic support programs
have a direct and harmful effect on the international cotton
market. 134 Specifically, the DSB found that there was a direct
causal link between U.S. Amber Box programs and depression
of world prices, which caused serious prejudice in violation of
the SCM Agreement. 13 5 This conclusion is important in that it
affirms the criticism many developing countries have levied
against the developed world, and which have been largely ignored, since the Uruguay Round. 136 In particular, this ruling
confirms the allegations set forth in the Sectoral Initiative in
Favour of Cotton, which stated that domestic support programs
used by the United States have a significant and harmful effect
on the price of cotton on world markets.1 37 This decision is,
therefore, a symbolic affirmation of developing countries' frustrations over the pace of, and commitment of developed coun1 38
tries to, serious liberalization of agriculture.
The true significance of this precedent, however, is not its
symbolic import. It is of great consequence because it has large
potential for use in claims of prejudice against a number of
other domestic support programs. 139 The Peace Clause has, until this ruling, barred virtually all potential claims against the
domestic support programs of developed countries. 40 As a result, a developed country's classification of a program as Green
Box, rather than Amber Box, has never before been challenged. 141 In the case of U.S. cotton, the panel found that the
subsidies at issue were improperly classified by the United
States as Green Box. 142 The panel went on to find that $2.3-4.1
billion in Amber Box subsidies per year from 1999-2000 de133. But cf. JOSLING, supra note 20, at 14 (discussing recent high-profile WTO
decisions fuelling concerns about democratic legitimacy of the WTO process).
134. See Pruzin, supra note 119, at 717 (summarizing WTO panel ruling on Upland Cotton).
135. Id. at 716.
136. See Pruzin, supra note 99, at 1093 (discussing conflicting views between
developing countries and the United States over U.S. domestic support); Pruzin, supra note 119, at 716 (discussing critics of U.S. agricultural subsidy programs).
137. See SECTORAL INITIATIVE, supra note 73, at 4.
138. See id.
139. Minutes, Standing Committee, International Cotton Advisory Committee,
SC-M-473 Final, at 3 (June 2, 2004), at http://www.icac.org/icac/delegates/scminutes/2004/473.pdf (summarizing presentation of Prof. Joseph Pelzman) [hereinafter Standing Committee].
140. Pruzin, supra note 119, at 716.
141.

Id.

142.

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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pressed world cotton prices by 12.6 percent. 143 Subsidy programs of this magnitude are not confined solely to the U.S. cotton industry: the thirty OECD countries provided over $318 billion in total support to agriculture in 2002.144 U.S. and EU
support programs for cereal and soybeans, as well as the EU's
cotton regime, are likely to be targeted in the near future.145
Furthermore, on October 15, 2004, the DSB issued its report on
a second claim by Brazil, finding that the EU had significantly
exceeded its scheduled commitments on exportation of heavily
subsidized sugar for every year since 1995.146 In short, there
are a significant number of domestic support programs that are
susceptible to attack, and to which the precedent of this case is
directly applicable.
The likelihood that claims will be filed against a number of
other domestic support programs is increased by the establishment of a relatively low evidentiary showing required in serious
prejudice claims. 147 As this type of case had not previously been
heard by the DSB, it was necessary to adopt an evidentiary
standard for demonstrating "serious prejudice." 148 Instead of
adopting a more stringent evidentiary standard, the panel decided on a standard which effectively lowers the showing required of developing countries: a country is not required to produce any precise quantification of the subsidy at issue in order
149
to prove "serious prejudice."
The precedent set by this case is, therefore, important both
in that it affirms the position of many developing countries with
respect to the damaging effects of domestic support programs
used in developed countries, and because it has possible applicability to a large number of existing domestic support programs. This decision stands for the proposition that the domestic subsidies of developed countries may now be questioned, and
in order to be found actionable, precise subsidy quantifications
are not required. Hence, the challenge and its outcome are in

143. Pruzin, supra note 119, at 716-17.
144. Id. at 716.
145. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Ruling on Cotton Expected to Pose Challenge to
United States, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1032, 1033 (Jun. 17, 2004); Unraveling
the Details,supra note 122, at 13.
146. Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Panel Finds EU's Sugar Exports Vastly Overstep WTO Limits, 8 BRIDGES MONTHLY REV. 13 (Oct. 2004), at
http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES8-9.pdf.
147. Unraveling the Details, supranote 122, at 13.
148. See id.
149. See id.
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themselves significant because developing countries will be emboldened to assert complaints if they feel commitments are not
honored.
2. Solidarity and Setting the Agenda: The Group of West and
CentralAfrican Countries
The persistency and unity of voice demonstrated by the four
African nations illustrates how developing nations can, through
direct involvement, have a significant impact on agriculture negotiations. The Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton was considered by many to be a major factor in the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial in 2003.150

But in a very important sense, the

failure at Cancun was a positive development for developing nations. 151 The ambitious proposal by four African nations met resistance by the major cotton producing bodies: the United
States, EU, and China. In receiving such a response, the proposal served as a litmus test for the willingness of developed
152
countries to commit to negotiation of substantial reforms.
The practical effect of the Sectoral Initiative was that developing countries had a direct role in setting the agenda and voicing
their concerns. 15 3 Ultimately, the failure at Cancun was due to
the unwillingness of developed countries to acknowledge that
the geopolitics of the WTO had changed, and that flexibility was
required on their part to negotiate issues that are important to
1 54
the developing world.
The growing influence and assertiveness of developing
countries is further seen in the fact that the July Package contains a distinct provision addressing the cotton issue originally
raised by the African countries. 155 Although the proposal elicited no response, stubbornness, or arrogance in the process of
negotiation from the United States, the four African countries
were able to maintain efforts towards the elimination of domes-

150.
151.

CANCUN MINISTERIAL, supra note 4, at 15-16.
See LESSONS OF CANCUN, supra note 67, at 9.

152. Id. at 16.
153. Id. at 15-16.
154. Id. The emergence of the G20 at Cancun as an influential negotiating
power has been widely recognized and is a further demonstration of the better balance emerging between developed and developing countries in the WTO. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing inclusion of
cotton as a separate issue in July Package).
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tic support measures on cotton.156 The willingness of the United
States to specifically include provisions on cotton is arguably related to the then-pending decision against it in the Upland Cotton dispute with Brazil. 15 7 Even in this matter, Chad and Benin
asserted their rights to participate as LDC third parties; accordingly, the panel took account of their allegations that U.S. subsidies caused harm to foreign cotton industries as evidentiary
158
support.
The success of the four African countries in getting the
United States to specifically address cotton in the July Package
highlights several important points for similar action on the
part of developing countries in the future. First, the four LDCs
worked together where continued persistence would have been
difficult on the part of one country alone. Developing countries,
and LDCs in particular, have faced significant difficulties maintaining active participation in daily WTO operations; maintaining a regular presence in Geneva is an extremely complex and
expensive endeavor. 159 Continued cooperation, to overcome this
barrier, was ultimately possible because the issue addressed by
the countries was extremely narrow. 160 This is essential for
proper cooperation, since developing nations are an extremely
heterogeneous group with diverse interests. 161 This focus and
cooperation has demonstrated that developing countries have
the power, within the current WTO system, to affect positive
change in terms of setting the agenda to focus on issues of
paramount importance to them. The inaccessibility of the negotiating process and continued dominance of developed countries
is what caused the Seattle Ministerial to fail. 62 The Cancun
Ministerial failed because developing countries attempted to set
the agenda, but developed countries resisted. 6 3 Hence, for the
first time, developing countries have successfully used the WTO
64
system to accomplish a positive result of their own design.1
156. See Yerkey, supra note 115, at 1306.
157. Unraveling the Details, supra note 122, at 13.
158. Id. at 12.
159. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
160. See SECTORAL INITIATIVE, supra note 73, at 2 (stating that "[tihe elimination of subsidies for cotton production and export is the only specific interest of WCA
cotton-producing countries in the Doha Round"); cf. SEATTLE MINISTERIAL, supra
note 1, at 4 (stating that disagreement and consequent failure of Seattle Ministerial
stemmed from, inter alia, complexity of issues being addressed).
161. See CANCUN MINISTERIAL, supranote 4, at 2-3.
162. See supra note 34.
163. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Avery, supra note 80, at 7A (discussing developing countries "flexing
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3. The Combined Effect of Unity and Precedent
These two developments, the establishment of significant
precedent and unity of position among developing countries in
order to affect change in the agenda, represent an improving
balance in overall negotiations. After ten years of WTO existence, developing countries have reached a point where precedent supports their most pressing needs, 165 countries disadvantaged in terms of relative size and resources are finding ways to
work together to affect change, and thus the overall imbalance
perceived in the WTO negotiating process throughout the implementation period appears to be improving in favor of developing countries. 166 Perhaps most significantly, this change in balance has occurred not as a result of concessions from developed
countries, but rather as a result of using the system that all
167
WTO members designed during the Uruguay Round.
The significance of this change in balance is of two kinds.
One, it is important to note that such a change in balance demonstrates that despite difficult progress, the system put in place
is becoming more effective in accomplishing its stated aim of
"establish[ing] a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading
system." 168

Second, given the context of ongoing negotiations,

the acknowledgement of a change in balance indicates that
there are other major powers involved in striking a balance. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the relative changes in position of other major negotiating powers in order to arrive at a
true picture of the current balance.
B. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN U.S. DOMESTIC SUPPORT PROGRAMS
AND ITS ABILITY TO LEAD
The outlook for a better balance between developed and developing countries in the future of agriculture negotiations assumes, however, that the United States will continue to act in
its customary role as a leader. 16 9 The context of recent agriculture negotiations has changed substantially, due largely to a
shift in the primary focus of agriculture negotiations from extheir muscles" at Cancun).
165. See infra Part III.C (discussing the use of WTO precedence in litigation).
166. See, e.g., Bhala, supranote 36, at 487.
167. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (discussing Marrakesh Agreement and the AoA).
168. AoA, supra note 8, preamble.
169. See supranotes 43-45; see also supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.

2005]

THE FUTURE OF WTO AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS

325

port subsidies to domestic support, 170 and to the rise of cotton
subsidies as a central issue. 171 Accordingly, the persistence of
U.S. domestic policy-makers in maintaining current domestic
support levels poses a real and serious risk to the ability of U.S.
trade negotiators to demonstrate needed flexibility, and consequently to facilitate trade negotiations through its role as a
leader.
1. The Customary Role of the United States in Working Towards
FurtherLiberalization
The concept of balance is important in analyzing international trade negotiations; a significant aspect of this notion is
the balancing of domestic policies with international commitments.1 72 It is unsurprising that countries typically attempt to
negotiate terms that are favorable to their producers and markets and which lessen the shock of drastic reform to domestic
policies in accordance with international agreements.1 73 In this
sense, the balance between international agreements and domestic policy is crucial to the success of negotiations; without
reasonable domestic political support of the negotiating process
and its outcomes, countries are powerless to effectively participate in constructive dialogue with other countries.1 74 There is a
direct correlation between the relative importance of a single
country in the negotiating process and the impact of (sizeable)
domestic tension on the probability of negotiations ending in
success.1 75 Therefore, experience demonstrates that trade negotiations are most productive when all countries come prepared
to negotiate with a clear conception of their goals, dedicated to
overall negotiation objectives, and willing/able to make concessions. 176 The absence of these factors from the agriculture mo170. The United States continues to focus on market access; however, there is a
clear shift on the part of many other WTO members in focus from export subsidies to
domestic subsidies, due to EU agreement to phase out their reliance on export subsidies. See Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 108, at 1266-67.
171. See supra Part I.C.2.b (discussing cotton initiative in context of Cancun
Ministerial); supra Part I.D.3 (discussing Brazil v. United States-Upland Cotton);
see also notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing inclusion of agreement on
further cotton negotiations in July Package).
172. See Bhala, supra note 36, at 483.
173. Id.
174. See Corbet, supra note 7, at 68 (discussing relationship between domestic
politics and agriculture negotiations).
175. See supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing failure to reach modalities deadline).
176. Compare Part I.C.2.a, with I.D.2 (reaching agreement on Agriculture
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dalities negotiations and Cancun Ministerial is largely why
177
those meetings failed.
Bearing these factors in mind, the United States has earned
its reputation throughout the implementation period as a leader
in making progress in ongoing negotiations. In evaluating the
leadership of the United States to date, it is important to distinguish between two aspects of ongoing negotiations: continued
progress in agricultural negotiations and the actual results of
implemented agreements. It is clear that the schedule of reductions set forth in the AoA, most clearly with respect to domestic
support subsidies, were not dramatic in accomplishing significant liberalization of trade in agriculture. 178 While it has been
argued that the insubstantial reductions implemented to date
under the AoA indicate a lack of true commitment to reform, it
is clear that the AoA represents, in the least, a beginning and
potential for further liberalization. 179 Likewise, the launching of
a new round at Doha, and the drafting of a framework for further agriculture reduction commitments are all positive steps,
particularly in light of the increasing participation of developing
countries.1 80 Therefore, regardless of the substantive effects of
these numerous agreements, frameworks, and scheduled reductions, they represent nominal progress towards a fairer system
of agricultural trade.
These progressive agreements have been difficult to reach,
and the United States has been widely recognized as a necessary force in reconciling divergent interests.1 8 1 The United
States has demonstrated the necessary commitment to the aims
of the AoA, has had a clear conception of its objectives, and perhaps most importantly, has shown its ability, and urged others,
to be flexible throughout negotiations.1 8 2 Assumption of this
role on the part of the United States has been possible both because of its status in world trade and because of the focus of negotiations. Clearly, given that the United States is a major force
in world trade, it is necessary that it be a leader.18 3 More importantly, the United States has been able to demonstrate flexiframework in light of EU's agreement to phase out export subsidies).
177. See supra Parts I.C.2.a, I.C.2.b (discussing failure to reach modalities deadline and collapse of the Cancun Ministerial, respectively).
178. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
179. ORDEN, supranote 28, at 7.
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. See supra notes 43-45, 60-61, 99 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
183. See Brevetti, supra note 99, at 385.
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bility and thus assume a leadership role because, since the Uruguay Round, much of the focus for continued reform has been on
market access and export subsidies;1 8 4 the United States does
not rely heavily on either of these measures.1 8 5 Consequently,
despite criticism for enacting the 2002 Farm Bill,186 the position
of the United States with respect to the main focus of continuing
negotiations has not been in direct and substantial conflict with
U.S. domestic policy. Therefore, during the past ten years, the
United States has been able to maintain a proper balance between advocating for further liberalization while not significantly changing existing support structures in its own agricultural sector.
2. Maintaininga Multilateral Trade System Favorable to the
American Cotton Industry
The ability of the United States to maintain its status as
leader and facilitator of agriculture trade negotiations has become significantly more complex in light of the recent shift in
the focus of agriculture negotiations. In looking at the position
of the United States with respect to maintenance of its domestic
support programs, the tension between international agriculture negotiations and U.S. domestic policy becomes apparent.
This apparent tension will significantly limit U.S. trade negotiators' ability to demonstrate necessary flexibility in ongoing negotiations. Thus the cotton issue, analyzed from the perspective
of U.S. domestic policy, demonstrates a stark divergence between past assumption of leadership by the United States, and
18 7
its future ability to do so.
a. Indications of Resistance
Significant indications of U.S. inflexibility first became apparent during the Cancun Ministerial, when the group of West
and Central African Countries introduced the Sectoral Initiative
in Favour of Cotton.1 8 Between the Cancun Ministerial and the
agreement on cotton included in the July Package, the United
States consistently resisted calls to directly address cotton sub184.
185.
186.
criticism
187.
188.

Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 108, at 1266-67.
ORDEN, supra note 28, at 33.
See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing enactment and
of 2002 Farm Bill).
See infra Part III.B.
See supranotes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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sidies.' 8 9 Given that U.S. cotton subsidies were at the time the
subject of a WTO dispute settlement complaint, it was understandable that the United States delayed meaningful negotiations in order to take the panel ruling into account in shaping
its strategy. The manner in which the United States handled
repeated claims to address cotton subsidies was, however, inappropriate in light of the United States's consistent urging that
flexibility is a necessary component to ongoing negotiations. 190
Because the cotton issue is a problem of paramount importance
to many developing nations, 191 the outright refusal of the United
States to engage in constructive negotiations has stated clearly
its defensive position and lack of willingness to undertake reform, despite the fact that the United States is clearly the largest subsidizer of cotton. 192 Accordingly, the United States failed
to demonstrate that when its interests are directly involved, as
opposed to reform discussions on market access or export subsidies, it is willing to actively participate to arrive at an equitable
result.
In the eyes of much of the international trade community,
the Upland Cotton ruling confirmed that the U.S. refusal to
work towards remedying the injurious effects of its cotton support programs was inappropriate. 193 Furthermore, the appeal
by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative is a further indication of an unwillingness to participate in ongoing negotiations
in a constructive manner. 194 The announcement to appeal the
decision is particularly significant, however, because the consequences of losing highlight the most troubling aspect of the U.S.
position on domestic support programs for cotton: U.S. trade
representatives may be unable to demonstrate the flexibility
WTO member-countries demand. The lack of negotiating flexibility arises from two distinct portions of the dispute settlement
ruling, discussed in the next section.
b. The United States's Refusal to Dismantle Domestic Support
Programs
First, should the United States lose on appeal, it will be al189.
190.
ity).
191.
192.
193.
194.

Pruzin, supranote 82, at 271.
See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing past U.S. leadership and need for flexibilSee supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
Pruzin, supranote 82, at 271.
See Pruzin, supra note 119, at 716.
US Appeals Report, supra note 127.
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most impossible for it to comply with the panel ruling, which requires withdrawal of certain Step 2 programs 195 within six
months of the final ruling. 196 Withdrawal of lucrative Step 2
programs held illegal is unlikely, because doing so would require
the approval of a reluctant U.S. Congress. 197 Reluctance exists
on the part of Congress because there is an extremely effective
farm lobby in developed countries, particularly the United
States, which is strongly opposed to measures that decrease
farm support. 198 As an editorial in the Washington Post characterized the U.S. farm lobby: "[t]he main reason for [the continuing use of farm subsidies in developed countries at the expense
of poor countries] lies in politics. Even though agriculture accounts for less than 3 percent of the U.S. work force,... farmers..., are adept at holding politicians hostage."' 99 The importance of such programs to U.S. farmers is best understood when
one considers that such programs have evolved around the central themes of raising/stabilizing farm income and preserving
200
the small farm.
The significance of farm programs for U.S. politics is particularly clear in a Presidential and Congressional election year.
For example, while proclaiming the positive state of the country
during the second presidential debate of 2004, President Bush
201
informed viewers that, "the farm income in America is high."
Although only three percent of the American workforce is employed in agriculture, farm wages were a central example of
America's current prosperity. Little political will exists to decrease current levels of farm support, because farmers are an
extremely persuasive and important constituency. If the United
States is required to withdraw Step 2 programs, it is very
195. Certain Step 2 programs were held by the dispute settlement panel to be
prohibited "export subsidies." See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
While this analysis is largely concerned with U.S. reluctance to dismantle domestic
support measures, this aspect of the ruling is still highly significant because the
Step 2 programs support domestic markets. Id. In addition, the motivations and
issues involved in reluctance to bring the illegal programs into line with WTO
agreements are the same as those underlying domestic support measures. Id.
196. Pruzin, supra note 145, at 1032. For consequences of failing to comply, see
infra notes 263-269 and accompanying text.
197. Pruzin, supranote 145, at 1032.
198. See Corbet, supra note 7, at 68.
199. The Farm-Subsidy Scandal, Editorial, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2001, at A24.
200. Baffes, supra note 29, at 12.
201. President George W. Bush, closing statement of second presidential debate,
Washington University, St. Louis, MO, Oct. 8, 2004, transcript available at
http://www.debates.org/pages/ trans2004c.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2004); see also
Avery, supra note 80, at 7A.
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20 2
unlikely that Congress will respect the WTO ruling.
The second significant aspect of the cotton ruling, classification of U.S. support programs as Amber Box rather than Green
Box, likewise poses significant problems to U.S. domestic policy. 203 After the Uruguay Round, the United States largely
turned away from export subsidies and tariffs, and designed
programs with Green Box measures to ensure compliance with
the AoA and yet maintain significant support programs for
farmers. 204 The consequence of finding certain PFC and DP programs Amber Box is that the United States will be required to
re-classify billions of dollars in farm support as Amber Box, and
205
such programs will then be subject to reduction commitments.
This result is significant because the implications of the ruling
apply not just to the cotton industry, but to the entire U.S. agricultural sector. In 2001-2002, for example, U.S. farmers received nearly $17 billion through DP programs. 20 6 While the
panel decision does not affect all DP programs formerly classified as Green Box, given that the United States has met approximately fifty percent of its reduction commitment of $19.1
billion (as of 1998), even a portion of the total DP programs subsequently subject to reduction commitments could threaten the
ability of the United States to meet its reduction commitments. 207 The potential difficulties in meeting reduction commitments as a result of the ruling are exacerbated by the domestic support provisions of the July Package, which call for a
further twenty percent reduction in combined support provided

through Final Total Bound

AMS.208

Therefore, should the

United States lose upon appeal, compliance with current and
near-future reduction commitments could pose a significant
problem.
Just as is the case with Step 2 programs determined to be
illegal export subsidies, there is little political will to change legislation to reflect WTO interpretations of American programs as
Amber Box. The response of the U.S. farm constituency to the
July Package demonstrates how, politically, removal of farm
202. See infra Part III.C. (discussing consequence of non-compliance and threat
of increased litigation).
203. See supra Part I.D.3 (discussing WTO panel decision against the United
States).
204. Supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
205. Pruzin, supra note 119, at 717.
206. ORDEN, supranote 28, at 9, 40.
207. Pruzin, supranote 119, at 717.
208. July Package, supra note 100, Annex A, 7.
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support is extremely unpopular. 20 9 Furthermore, the domestic
response indicates a lack of trust between sectors of the domestic agriculture industry and trade representatives. 210 In fact,
according to the U.S. Cotton Council, the panel's interpretation
of AoA commitments and definitions varies greatly from those of
2 11
the United States at the time it entered into the agreement.
As a result of the Upland Cotton ruling, the job of trade negotiators in the WTO just became significantly more difficult, because U.S. farmers and politicians are far less likely to trust any
agreements that come before Congress for approval and enactment into law. 21 2 Consequently, appealing the decision is the
most likely chance the United States has to avoid the significant
problem of aligning domestic policy and international commitments.
If the United States loses its appeal, it is likely that it will
have to make substantial changes to its domestic support policy.
Regardless of whether the U.S. Trade Representative chooses to
"unilaterally disarm" in accordance with international commitments, it appears as though, due to domestic politics, the United
States will not be willing to change its policies prior to the expiration of the current Farm Bill in 2008.213 Essentially, the dispute settlement panel ruling has highlighted the fact that U.S.
domestic support is injurious, and given that the United States
currently structures most of its programs as domestic support,
there is no course of action left for the United States but to take
serious steps towards reducing reliance on trade-distorting domestic support measures. The refusal of U.S. politicians to take
account of this has extremely troubling consequences for the
success of the current Doha Round.

209. Christopher S. Rugaber, Zoellick, Blasting Daschle, Says Framework for
Doha will not Hurt U.S. Farm Programs, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1341, 1341
(Aug. 12, 2004). Senator Tom Daschle sharply criticized U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick for his agreement to the July Package, arguing that the 20 percent
reduction in domestic support "dealt a devastating blow to farm support... [that is]
necessary to protect producers." Id.
210. See id.
211. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Cotton Producers Promise to Fight WTO Ruling
but Also to Abide by WTO Rules, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 911, 911 (May 27,
2004).
212. Id.
213. Cain, supra note 58, at 830.
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III. LACK OF PROGRESS DUE TO THE POSITION OF THE
UNITED STATES AND RESPONSIVE LITIGATION
A. THE CURRENT CLIMATE OF AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND
WHAT IS AT STAKE
Logically, agriculture negotiations should be viewed as a
progression, where the AoA represents a foundation and the
DDA a commitment towards further liberalization of agriculture
trade. 214 This progression has been characterized by failed attempts and difficult accomplishments, 215 and the line between
success and failure is often quite thin.216 It is clear, however,
that there is a commitment to furthering the objectives of the
AoA and reaching a successful conclusion to the DDA, as evidenced by continuing support for the WTO, continued efforts at
honoring commitments, and continuing participation in negotiations.
Despite this continuing commitment, many accomplishments under the AoA have not been substantial in terms of delivering on the promises of increasing liberalization in agriculture. 217 In the ten years since the signing of the AoA, countries
have not been able to effectively negotiate an agriculture modalities text. Moreover, while agreements subsequent to the
AoA reflect successively more narrow agreements for further
218
liberalization, they make no specific reduction commitments.
Accordingly, the most difficult series of agriculture negotiations
219
clearly lie ahead.
As the focus of negotiations becomes increasingly narrow,
the leadership of the United States will be essential for bridging
gaps and forging a consensus. 220 At this stage in negotiations, if
agreement cannot be reached on an agriculture modalities text,
214. See, e.g., ORDEN, supranote 28, at 7.
215. See generally supraPart I.
216. See, e.g., Part I.D.2 (discussing last-minute agreement on the July Package).
217. See, e.g., supra Part 1.B (discussing implementation of AoA).
218. Compare Part I.C.2 (discussing problems in furthering the Doha Round,
particularly failure to reach a modalities agreement), with Part I.D.2 (discussing
agreement on the July Package, which is not a modalities text, but rather a framework).
219. See, e.g., Bhala, supra note 36, at 482 (quoting WTO Director-General
Moore as saying that Doha put the WTO in a position where future progress would
be difficult).
220. Brevetti, supra note 99, at 385; see also LESSONS OF CANCUN, supra note
67, at 4.
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three years of substantial effort on the part of WTO members
will have been lost; the DDA is a single undertaking, and without agreement on agriculture, there will be no successful conclusion to the Doha Round. 22 1 Furthermore, loss of current momentum as a result of the inability to reach agreement will
likely result in several years of inactivity before another serious
attempt can be made at launching a new round. Due to the U.S.
position on maintaining domestic support programs in opposition to existing WTO agreements, the United States will not be
able to act in its customary role as a leader, which will likely
have adverse effects upon continuing negotiations.
B. THE EFFECT OF THE U.S. POSITION ON CONTINUING
NEGOTIATIONS

1. Short-Term Implications: Uncertainty
CoA meetings took place in October, November, and December of 2004, to move forward, and agree on specific provisions in accordance with the guidelines set out in the July Package. 222 As past meetings have demonstrated, it is essential that

countries come to meetings with a clear conception of what it is
they hope to accomplish and willingness to demonstrate flexibility in coming to an agreement between all members. 223 With respect to domestic support negotiations, the United States will
not know what its position is until the appeal has been heard,
and a final ruling issued on whether U.S. support measures are
properly classified as Green Box or Amber Box. The appeal on
Upland Cotton will not have been decided until after the final
CoA meeting in December. 224 This uncertainty is of particular
importance, given that revising Green Box policy has emerged
225
as a contentious issue as of the first CoA meeting in October.
As a result of its position, the United States will not be able to
play a decisive role in shaping short-term continuing negotia221. See LESSONS OF CANCUN, supra note 67, at 3.
222. Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Agriculture Talks Inch Forward, 8 BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 13, 2004, at
http://www.ictsd.orgweekly/04-10-13/story3.htm.
223. See, e.g., supranote 176 and accompanying text.
224. The United States filed its notice of appeal on October 18, 2004. US Appeals Report, supra note 127. The WTO's Appellate Body thereafter has 90 days to
issue a ruling. Pruzin, supranote 145, at 1032.
225. Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., supra note 222.
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tions on domestic support.
If reform of Green Box policy becomes a focus of the nearterm CoA meetings, the United States's inability to substantially participate could have serious consequences for overall
progress. This is a serious concern, as there is early disagreement between the Cairns Group and developed countries,
namely the EC and Switzerland, as to whether Green Box reform is properly within the scope of the July Package. 226 As the
sides are drawn, this is traditionally a situation where the
United States has stepped in to bridge gaps and build consensus. 227 The United States has only stated an indeterminate position-essentially being noncommittal-and thus demonstrated
how the current U.S. position impairs its ability to lead in a
228
meaningful way.
2. Long-Term Effects of the United States's Position: Standing
in the Way of Progress
Regardless of whether the U.S. appeal is successful, the position of U.S. Trade Representatives in ongoing agriculture negotiations is disconcertingly similar to that of the EC in 2003.
As a result of political unwillingness to reform domestic farm
policies throughout the EU, EC agriculture negotiators were
unable to demonstrate flexibility in negotiations regarding the
elimination of export subsidies, and the modalities deadline was
missed. 229 The unwillingness of U.S. domestic political forces to
work towards the phasing out of trade-distorting domestic support measures effectively strips U.S. Trade Representatives of
the necessary ability to demonstrate flexibility in negotiations. 230 This flexibility is essential to working towards agreement in agricultural matters. Therefore, as a result of domestic
political refusal to remove support programs for farmers, the
United States will not be able to contribute, in a meaningful ca226. Id. The July Package states that the Green Box should be "reviewed and
clarified" to ensure that it is at most, minimally trade distorting. Id. Countries disagree as to whether current development of strong disciplines is beyond the scope of
the July Package. Id.
227. See, e.g., supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
228. See Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., supra note 222. The
United States's position at this time is that there may be some room to negotiate
Green Box reform. Id.
229. See supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing failure to reach March 31, 2003 modalities deadline).
230. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing unwillingness of U.S. politicians to remove domestic support programs).
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pacity, towards reduction and elimination of trade distorting
domestic support. As a major trading power, the inability to
contribute is not a minor irritation or drawback. The constructive engagement of the United States in all aspects of ongoing
negotiations, particularly domestic support, is necessary if there
is to be a successful conclusion. 231 Consequently, the United
States's inability to contribute on the focus of ongoing negotiations will prevent further progress under the current round.
Relative to the failure caused by the EU in 2003, several
factors make it more likely that the U.S. position on domestic
support measures will impede successful conclusion of the current Round. First, an analysis of previous agriculture negotia232
Second,
tions demonstrates the necessity of U.S. leadership.
the current negotiations aim at a text more technical and narrow than in previous agreements. 233 Hence, the act of arriving
at a text, particularly in the absence of U.S. leadership, is inherently more difficult. Third, as a function of the time that has
passed since the Doha Round was launched, the current negotiations carry with them greater expectations and existing frus234
trations, resulting in comparably greater pressure to succeed.
Furthermore, the consequences of failing are greater as wellthree years of hard work and modest gains lost. Finally, as a
result of the current panel decision against U.S. cotton subsidies, there is an objective assessment of U.S. programs that concludes they are harmful and improperly classified. Therefore, if
the United States persists in refusing to dismantle its tradedistorting domestic support measures, the ongoing agriculture
negotiations are likely to fail.
It could be argued in response, that the alternative to complete failure of the Round is an agriculture modalities text that
fails to make further progress with respect to domestic support
measures, leaves progress in that area for future negotiations,
and thus allows the Round to move forward. In support of this
alternative, it can be pointed out that developing countries accepted a similar result in signing the July Package: developing
countries recognized the need to accept a watered-down text in
order to keep the talks afloat, but refused to accept any text
where they would be worse off than where they currently

231.
232.
233.
234.

See Brevetti, supra note 99, at 385.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra note 95.
See, e.g., Pruzin & Yerkey, supranote 95, at 1266-68.
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Despite this common sentiment among developing

countries, the United States was able to serve its own interests
and include an expanded definition of the Blue Box to include
236
countercyclical payments.
This alternative is not likely to occur, however, as further
postponements on the subject of domestic support measures will
be unacceptable to developing countries. The concession to the
United States was made because there was general political will
to move forward, and as a framework (versus a modalities text),
the July Package is necessarily drafted in general terms. 237 Negotiations upon a modalities text will involve a considerably different set of circumstances. First, the negotiating dynamic is
significantly changed now that export subsidies are no longer a
focus of negotiations; 238 lines will be more clearly drawn according to countries' focus on obtaining better market access (i.e.,
developed countries) 239 or eliminating use of domestic support
measures (i.e., developing countries). 240 Second, while developing countries were clearly willing to make concessions in order
to come to agreement on the July Package, the framework calls
for further limitations on domestic support measures through
reexamination of Blue Box and Green Box categories to ensure
they serve the overarching principles of the AoA.241 Finally, the

culmination of recent developments is empowerment of developing countries and thereby a better balance in the negotiation
process. 242 Therefore, the behavior of the United States in making concessions on its domestic support programs, particularly
in the cotton industry, is likely to be dispositive in the successful
outcome of the continuing Doha Round.

235. Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 108, at 1266-67 (discussing statements by Argentina's Secretary of International Trade, Martin Redrado).
236. Id.
237. See Pruzin & Yerkey, supranote 108, at 1266.
238. Compare supra notes 18-19 (discussing EU reliance on export subsidies
under CAP as focus of ongoing negotiations), with supra note 104 and accompanying
text (discussing EU agreement to give abandon reliance on export subsidies).
239. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Review Draft Ag Framework, 21
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1220, 1220 (July 22, 2004) (discussing main objective of
United States in negotiations leading up to July Package).
240. See, e.g., Yerkey, supra note 94 at 1306 (discussing how developing countries' will no longer be willing to be "short-changed" on the subject of domestic subsidies).
241. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
242. Supra Part II.A.
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C. Is LITIGATION THE ANSWER?
The combination of a number of factors-expiration of the
Peace Clause, the Upland Cotton ruling, continued frustration
of developing countries, increasing unity and influence among
developing countries, failure to make progress in further reducing the use of trade-distorting domestic support in developed
countries-have created the perfect atmosphere for a "trade
war."243 Such a trade war would represent a shift in the primary focus of the WTO from facilitating ongoing trade negotiations to deciding trade disputes. 24 4 The possibility of increased
litigation has been heralded as a means for developing countries
to achieve the promises of liberalization. 245 While there are a
number of beneficial aspects inherent in a shift towards litigation-focused WTO, several pragmatic concerns ultimately demonstrate that litigation is not the means by which true liberalization of agriculture will be achieved. Rather, in order for true
progress, ongoing negotiations need true commitment and patience from all participating countries, primarily the United
States.
1. ProposedBenefits of a Litigation-FocusedWTO System
The opportunity for litigation has been heralded as a means
for developing countries to obtain the promised benefits of trade
liberalization. 246 The cotton dispute created valuable precedent
that can potentially be used against a number of other countries
to enforce compliance with existing agreements. 247 In this
sense, the promise of liberalization under the AoA would be
more significantly realized than it has been with the existing
degree of compliance. In light of the growing frustration of developing countries, particularly as demonstrated by the Sectoral
Initiative in Favour of Cotton, and consequent rush of claims
expected, the extensive use of litigation would shift the focus of
the WTO from a system of diplomatic concessions and negotiated settlements based on mutual and shared benefits to an adversarial system.248
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
ing).
248.

See Goldhaber & Fleischer-Black, supra note 92, at 15.
Standing Committee, supra note 139, at 3.
See Avery, supranote 80, at 7A.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing precedent created by Upland Cotton rulStanding Committee, supra note 139, at 2.
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As a rules-based system with a "single winner," the governance of international trade in agriculture would be more transparent. 249 Increased transparency in the process of developing
principles of agricultural trade is a development favorable and
important to developing countries; to date, the participation of
developing countries has been limited both by a lack of necessary resources 250 and because of exclusion from a number of negotiating sessions, the result of difficulties inherent in an organization with hundreds of member-countries. 25 1 Furthermore, the net impact of an increase in litigation would appear to
252
be greater adherence to existing agreements.
The re-organization of WTO negotiating procedures in response to a new focus on litigation would significantly affect future negotiations. 253 In such a system, the potential threat of
litigation, combined with the difficulty of negotiating multilateral agreements, would place more of an emphasis on simpler,
sector-specific bilateral agreements. 254 A shift in the focus of
the WTO to facilitating simpler bilateral agreements would result in an increase in agreements, again with far greater transparency than is present in the current system of multilateral
agreements. 2 55 Thus, a shift in the focus of the WTO system
from negotiation to litigation holds the potential to result in
greater compliance with existing agreements and create a more
transparent system for future negotiations, both of which generally benefit developing countries.
The agreement to include provisions related to the Sectoral
Initiative in the July Package demonstrates several of these factors coming into play. In this case, the threat of litigation arguably "forced" the United States to agree to inclusion of cotton
as a specific topic of negotiation within larger agriculture
talks. 25 6 The negotiations were essentially bilateral in nature,

as they occurred between the United States and four small
countries with very similar interests in the matter. 257 Finally,
249. Id.
250. Supra Part 0.
251. See, e.g., note 34 (discussing failure of 1999 Seattle Ministerial).
252. See Standing Committee, supra note 139, at 3. But cf. infra notes 262-268
and accompanying text (discussing the threats of regular use of litigation).
253. Id. at 2.
254. Id. In fact, the difficulties surrounding the failure of the Cancun Ministerial spurred such an increase in negotiation on bilateral and regional agreements.
See infra notes 272-274 and accompanying text.
255. See Standing Committee, supra note 139, at 2-3.
256. See Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., supra note 122, at 13.
257. See Yerkey, supra note 112, at 1306.
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the result of these direct negotiations between the United States
and African countries was a sector-specific agreement on how to
move forward on the issue of cotton support and its effect on Af258
rican production.
2. PragmaticConcerns Against a Litigation-FocusedSystem
a. Logistical Difficulties Inherent in a System of Regular WTO
Litigation
The regular use of international litigation to ensure compliance with current agreements will be difficult, if not impossible,
for many developing countries. Litigation through the WTO is a
complex endeavor, which requires substantial financial and intellectual resources. 259 In order for the WTO to function properly, it is necessary that all members participate in basic functions equally and effectively. Given the current difficulties
developing countries face in maintaining an effective presence
in Geneva, many developing countries will continue to have insufficient resources to undertake lengthy and complex trade
litigation. 260 Litigation as a regular tool to enforce compliance
or reconcile different interpretations of existing agreements is
26 1
simply not a viable alternative for many developing countries.
Even where a developing country possesses sufficient resources to engage in litigation as a means to enforce compliance,
such a strategy ignores political realities. It has been suggested
that litigation holds the potential to "take abusive farm subsidies away from the politicians."262 However, with the current
political situation in the United States, politicians are unlikely
to amend existing litigation to reflect the changes mandated by
the panel decision. 263 Ultimately, should the United States not
comply with the panel decision, WTO rules allow Brazil to impose trade sanctions against the United States until it has com264
plied.
258. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing inclusion of cotton-related issues in July
Package).
259. See e.g., Bhala, supra note 36, at 488; Goldhaber & Fleischer-Black, supra
note 92, at 15.
260. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
261. But cf. Standing Committee, supra note 139, at 3 (stating that there is
"greater capacity among developing countries to bring complaints within the WTO").
262. Avery, supra note 80, at 7A.
263. See supra Part II.B.2.
264. JOSLING, supra note 20, at 14.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vo1.14:2

Trade sanctions were originally conceived of as a way of
putting gentle pressure on governments to adhere to dispute
265
settlement panel rulings under a multilateral trading system.
In a litigation-focused system, trade sanctions could become the
norm, rather than the exception, thereby allowing countries to
continue to violate trade agreements so long as the costs of compliance are greater than those of sanctions. 266 Trade sanctions
are currently the exception, and panel decisions largely adhered
to, because a focus on a multilateral system of negotiation maintains international political pressure on governments to make
required changes, thereby preserving the integrity of the multi267
lateral negotiating system to the benefit of all members.
Therefore, regular use of litigation to ensure compliance poses
the significant threat of actually allowing countries to retreat
from current agreements through other countries' use of trade
68
sanctions, to the detriment of international trade.2
b. Attendant Conceptual Difficulties
A shift in focus of the current WTO system towards litigation is conceptually problematic, because such a shift would
work against the fundamental aim of the AoA: development of a
fair market-based system of trade in agriculture. 269 Litigation,
if used regularly as a tool by developing countries, will likely
evolve into a retaliatory weapon used by developed countries:
larger developing countries have agriculture industries that
utilize support and protection mechanisms, and are thus subject
to claims by other countries as well.270 In this context, a shift
away from complex multilateral agreements towards transparent, sector-specific, bilateral agreements makes sense, as countries will want to reduce costs associated with litigation, and bilateral agreements will serve to preempt litigation or to remedy
unfavorable situations created by the imposition of tariffs
through previous litigation. Smaller developing countries do
not, however, utilize domestic support programs or export sub265. Id.
266. See id. But cf. Standing Committee, supra note 139, at 3 (suggesting that
litigation gives politicians a politically acceptable reason to change domestic legislation in order to comply with international obligations).
267. One such example is the continued pressure countries placed on the EU to
eliminate export subsidy programs that violated the spirit of the AoA. Supra note
104 and accompanying text.
268. JOSLING, supra note 20, at 14.
269. See AoA, supra note 6, preamble.
270. See Goldhaber & Fleischer-Black, supra note 92, at 15.
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sidies because they are expensive programs to maintain. 271 As
such, smaller countries will be precluded from regular use of
litigation due to lack of resources, and there will be reduced incentive for larger countries to engage in bilateral negotiations
with smaller countries. Consequently, in a system where bilateral agreements become prevalent as a response to litigation,
smaller developing countries will be excluded from many aspects of the WTO system.
This is not to say that a system of bilateral agreements, independent of a litigation-focused system, necessarily excludes
all developing countries from meaningful participation. Since
the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial, there has been a significant increase in energy focused on bilateral and regional negotiations. 272 Many of these negotiations, working towards regional free trade agreements, are between developed countries
and smaller developing countries.2 7 3 In such a case however,
necessary resources are diverted away from participation in
multilateral negotiations, thereby decreasing the likelihood that
ongoing multilateral negotiations will be successful; hence,
while bilateral and multilateral negotiations/agreements are not
mutually exclusive, focusing on bilateral agreements has significant potential to negatively impact the viability of ongoing multilateral negotiations. 274 The important point with both bilateral agreements resulting from a litigation-focused system and
those bilateral agreements which exist alongside multilateral
agreements, is that there is no opportunity for meaningful participation by all countries in order to affect market liberalization. Under both situations, many small developing countries
and least developed countries are excluded from participating in
the process that affects change in international agricultural
trade.
The practical exclusion of smaller developing countries from
the WTO system of regulating international trade in agriculture

271. See Standing Committee, supra note 139, at 2.
272. See, e.g., Brevetti, supra note 99, at 385. See generally Int'l Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development, Regional Integration Spurred and Complicated
by Cancun, 7 BRIDGES MONTHLY REV. 16-19 (Sept.-Oct. 2004), at http://www.ictsd
.org/monthlyfbridges/ BRIDGES7-7.pdf [hereinafter Regional Integration].
273. Regional Integration,supra note 272, at 16-19. One example is the Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which is an agreement between the
United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Id. at
16.
274. See Brevetti, supra note 99, at 385 (citing comments made by WTO Director-General Supachai).
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would represent a significant erosion of the recent improvements in the system. In the current system, which focuses primarily on multilateral negotiations and agreements, developing
countries are increasingly participating and affecting positive
change. 275 The bilateral agreement-focused system that would
exist in the context of prevalent litigation is strikingly similar to
the pre-AoA environment of international trade.
Namely,
agreements and practices would be shaped by competition and
adverse interests, rather than working towards the common
goal of a fair, market-based system. Conceptually, the development of a WTO system of international trade in agriculture,
premised on the ability to litigate regularly, would represent a
period of regression from current progress made in the area of
276
agricultural trade liberalization.
3. The Solution: Real Commitment from Developed Nations,
Patienceand Restraint on the Partof DevelopingNations
It is clear that the most difficult period of negotiations lie
ahead. 277 Furthermore, it is in the best interests of all parties
involved to continue to utilize and support the current system of
multilateral agriculture negotiations. To ensure a successful
outcome of ongoing agriculture negotiations, and thus the Doha
Round, action is required on the part of both developing and developed countries.
Developing countries must show restraint in using the possibility of litigation to resolve frustrations that arise during the
course of ongoing multilateral negotiations. 278 It is clear from
the Upland Cotton dispute that the newly available option of
litigation is a valuable tool, which may help ensure compliance
with existing agreements. 2 79 But as the previous analysis points
275. See supra Part II.A.2.
276. This fact has been frequently recognized by the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative. Specifically, Allen F. Johnson has stated that cases such as the Upland Cotton dispute are not what "creates the necessary energy and momentum
that's going to create a successful conclusion [to the WTO trade talks.]" Pruzin, supra note 129, at 718 (quoting Allen F. Johnson, USTR Chief Agriculture Negotiator).
Instead, the United States has "always believed that negotiations are the best way
of solving these issues and moving the process forward." Id.
277. See Burfisher, supra note 17, at 135-37 (discussing benefits that would accrue to developing and developed countries if all agricultural subsidies and tariffs
were eliminated).
278. Unraveling the Details, supra note 122, at 13.
279. Supra Parts I.D.3 (discussing Upland Cotton case), II.A.1 (discussing precedent created by Upland Cotton case).
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out, the excessive use of litigation has the potential to drastically change the nature and focus of the WTO; such a change
would ultimately be detrimental to the interests of smaller developing countries. 28 0 As a result, it is incumbent upon developing countries to help maintain the system that is increasingly
working in their interests. Article 3.7 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding recognizes this fact, and mandates that WTO
members have a responsibility to consider the implications of
disputes they present to the DSB: "before bringing a case, a
Member shall exercise its judgment as to whether action under
these procedures would be fruitful." 28 1 Without such restraint,
much of the potential for progress in liberalizing trade will be
lost. 28 2
It is unreasonable, however, to expect developing countries
to show restraint indefinitely; there has been growing frustration during the past ten years over the unwillingness of developed countries to abandon programs that distort international
markets. If the current Round is to be successful, ultimately the
United States, and to a substantial degree other developed
countries as well, must ultimately take the true aims of the AoA
to heart, and work to align domestic policy with international
agreements. This goal is not impossible: the EU's agreement to
end its reliance on export subsidies is a significant development
that demonstrates domestic political forces can act according to
international agreements. 283 Without a true commitment, the
near future of the WTO negotiations, at least, will be characterized by a great deal of effort and ultimately a colossal failure to
acknowledge the true benefits which will accrue from implementation of increasingly greater liberalization of international
trade in agriculture.
CONCLUSION
International trade in agriculture has been governed by a
280. Supra Part IIl.C.2 (discussing negative effects of a shift in the WTO towards litigation).
281. Dispute Settlement Understanding, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M.
1226 (1994). The DSU, found in Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement, outlines the
procedures by which trade disputes are handled through the WTO. THE WTO
SECRETARIAT, supra note 10, at 20.
282. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing problems with a litigation-based WTO
system).
283. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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multilateral system of rules for ten years, and this period has
been characterized both by significant failures and difficult accomplishments. Despite numerous difficulties and criticisms, a
pattern of progress towards a system of increasingly liberalized
trade in agriculture is discernable. Recent events have demonstrated that developing countries are increasingly able to participate in the multilateral system to affect change that works in
their interests. This increased potential for future gains in liberalization of agricultural trade is, however, offset by recent actions of the United States. In particular, demonstrations of the
U.S. reluctance to dismantle its domestic support programs,
which have become the focus of ongoing agriculture talks and
have been condemned by the DSB, indicate that the United
States will be unable to act in its customary role as a leader in
the ongoing Doha Talks.
The interplay between these relative changes in negotiating
power and roles, in light of a number of other significant factors
including expiration of the Peace Clause, has made the likelihood of litigation over agricultural programs high. The potential impasse represented by the threat of a "trade war" poses a
significant threat to the nature of the WTO as it is known today,
most notably the promise of trade liberalization under the current multilateral system of trade in agriculture, as embodied in
the Doha Round. If the aims of the AoA are to be furthered, and
liberalization of agriculture continued, then action is required
on the part of all WTO member countries. Developing countries
have achieved a better balance in negotiating power and have at
their disposal the novel possibility of litigation. However, this
possibility also holds the potential to work against their interests in achieving greater liberalization of trade in agriculture.
As such, it is necessary that developing countries exercise sound
judgment and restraint in exercising this new-found power.
However, a true commitment to an equitable system of free
trade is also required on the part of the United States and other
developed countries.

